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Abstract: The blasphemy case of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, 
known as Ahok, who is a Christian and was Jakarta’s non-
Muslim governor, has sparked different reactions among 
Muslim groups in Indonesia. Reactions of Muslim groups of 
different persuasion in East Java will be highlighted in this 
article. Two theological constructions emerged out of this case, 
namely textual-normative and moderate-substantive construc-
tions. This article aims to identify theological construction and 
social actions as normative propositions and actions of Muslim 
groups in East Java. To comprehend the concepts and 
responses through the article, several leaders of the Muslim 
roups such as FPI (Front Pembela Islam), HTI (Hizb al-Tahrir 
Indonesia), FUI (Forum Umat Islam), MMI (Majlis Mujahidin 
Indonesia), Al-Irsyad, FS-LDK (Forum Studi Lembaga 
Dakwah Kampus), NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah 
were interviewed. The article finds that moderate and rational 
theological concept of blasphemy is coined by major Muslim 
groups especially NU and Muhammadiyah which prioritize 
greater national interest, whereas other Muslim roups, 
especially those with literal interpretation, promote political 
identity vis-à-vis other religious groups.  
Keywords: Blasphemy, religious construction, theology. 
 
Introduction  
Indonesia became the center of world attention during the 
campaign for the Governor of Jakarta general election held in February 
2017. The election was considered to be the dirtiest1, polarizing2 and 
                                                                
1 M. D. Conover, J. Ratkiewicz, M. Francisco, B. Goncalves, and A. Flammini, 
“Political Polarization on Twitter,” Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI 
Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 2011.  
2 James I. Lengle, Diana Owen, and Molly W. Sonner “Divisive Nominating 
Mechanisms and Democratic Party Electoral Prospects,” The Journal of Politics, 57, 2 
(May, 1995): pp. 370-383. 
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most divisive in which the candidates Anies Baswedan (Anies) -
Sandiaga Uno (Sandi) defeated the candidates Basuki Tjahaja Purnama 
(Ahok)-Jarot Saiful Hidayat (Jarot). In this election, Anis-Sandi was 
supported by several parties, notably Partai Gerindra, Partai Keadilan 
Sejatera (PKS, Justice and Prosperous Party) and Partai Amanat 
Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party). The campaign strategy of 
Anis-Sandi use religious sentiments as Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is a 
Protestant. This strategy intensified especially after Ahok’s statement in 
Kepulauan Seribu on 27th of September 2016 that led to blasphemy 
accusation against him. The strategy was seemingly responded by 
grassroots groups throughout the country by reflecting religious and 
ethnic sentiments into the political issue. Certainly, this blasphemy case 
further tainted Indonesian record of religious freedom.3 
The practice of religious and political identity4 is used to defend 
Islam to put Ahok behind bar by mobilizing Islamic mass 
organizations in some major cities on charges of religious blasphemy 
against Ahok as he accused that some clerics had misled Muslim 
community using a verse in the Holy Qur'an, namely chapter al-
Maidah verse 51. the verse itself contain a prohibition for Muslims to 
take Jews and Christians as wali. Wali is an Arabic word with multiple 
meanings, namely helper, supporter, benefactor, sponsor, friend, close 
associate, relative, patron, protector legal guardian, and saint.5 
However, the official translation of the Holy Quran issued by the 
Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs says that wali in that verse is 
pemimpin (Indonesian word for leader or ruler).6 The fact that many 
people who opposed his reelection use this meaning in the 
gubernatorial election campaign against Ahok, has triggered Ahok’s 
controversial statement.  
Terminologically, blasphemy refers to opposition to sacred 
religious symbols such as religion, religious leaders, religious 
                                                                
3 Paul Marshall, “The Ambiguities of Religious Freedom in Indonesia,” The Review of 
Faith & International Affairs, 16, 1 (2018): pp. 85-96. 
4 Samina Yasmeen “Pakistan, militancy and identity: parallel struggles,” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, 67, 2 (2013): pp. 157-175. 
5 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, 
Inc, 1976), p. 1100 
6 Ministry of Religious Affairs Republic Indonesia, Alqur’an dan Terjemahnya (Madinah 
Al-Munawwarah: Mujamma’ Al-Malik Fahd Li Thiba At Al Mush-haf Asy-Syarif, 
1993), p. 169. 
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scriptures.7 The situation over Ahok’s Blasphemous statement sparked 
more heated controversy as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the 
Indonesian Ulama Council)8 issued a fatwa (a non-binding legal 
opinion in Islamic law) declaring: “The statement of Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama is categorized as: (1) defaming the holy Qur’an and/or (2) 
defaming ulama who have legal authority in Islam”.9 Such a 
statement of MUI eventually triggered some hardline Muslims to 
form a movement called Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI 
(GNPF MUI, National Movement for Fatwa Guarding).10 GNPF 
then initiated and mobilized several demonstrations—eventually 
referring to popular movements of 411 and 212—forcing the court 
to put Ahok on trial, and eventually sent him behind bars. 
However, in response to the case of religious blasphemy by Ahok, 
in terms of religious institutions, Muslims have different theological 
views. The first group comes with textual11 and normative perspectives 
that Ahok has blasphemed Islam by defaming ‘ulama>’ and the Holy 
Qur’an. This group is specifically affiliated with hardliners within MUI 
and its fatwa supporters. Whereas, the second group—apparently 
affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhamadiyyah holds a 
                                                                
7 Siti Aminah, et al, “Pemantauan Kasus-Kasus Penodaan Agama di Indonesia Periode 
2012-2014,” Jurnal Keadilan Sosial, 5 (2015), p. 26. 
8 MUI was established by government during Suharto’s regime in 1975 to channel 
government’s voice on Islam. It is partly funded by government. Thus, from the 
beginning, the political nature of MUI is prevalent. It is comprised of Muslims from 
different streams in Indonesia, moderate and hardline Muslims alike. Its main function 
is to issue fatwa on several matters, including on guarding Islamic orthodoxy practices, 
sharia banking, and product (food, drug, cosmetics, etc.) lawfulness. The voice of MUI 
depends on which groups have effective control over its functions. Nowadays, 
hardliners have strong presence within MUI. For further account on MUI as a fatwa 
issuing body, please read for instance M. Atho Mudzhar, “The Legal Reasoning and 
Socio-Legal Impact of the Fatwãs of the Council of Indonesian Ulama on Economic 
Issues,” Ahkam, 13, 1 (January 2013), pp 9-20 and Syafiq Hasyim, “Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia and pluralism in Indonesia,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 41, 4-5 (2015), pp. 
487-495. 
9 “Pendapat Dan Sikap Keagamaan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Terkait Pernyataan 
Basuki Tjahaya Purnama,” https://mui.or.id/berita/10590/pendapat-dan-sikap-
keagamaan-mui-terkait-pernyataan-basuki-tjahaja-purnama/, 20 February 2017. 
10 Rangga Kusumo and Hurriyah, “Populisme Islam di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Aksi 
Bela Islam oleh GNPF-MUI Tahun 2016-2017,” Jurnal Politik, 4, 1 (2018), pp. 96-101. 
11 Mark. R. Woodward, “The ‘Slametan’: Textual Knowledge and Ritual Performance 
in Central Javanese Islam,” History of Religions, 28, 1 (1988), pp. 54-89.  
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formal juridical12 view which assesses the case of Ahok not as a 
religious issue but rather a civil case. Thus, it is the case of law 
enforcement officials to deal with.  
Apart from the pros and cons of Ahok’s case, this phenomenon 
exhibits social facts of people’s collectivity and solidarity dimension13 
triggering religious social movements. It means that the case of Ahok 
resulted in major problem which is not only a matter of political and 
religious context, but it also indicates the context of Muslim solidarity 
and collectivity.14 Nevertheless, Emile Durkheim protested blasphemy 
based on religious drives in which Islam has bound the followers,15 
despite of different traditions and customs.  
The issue of religious blasphemy, both in the past and present, has 
made people unite under religious concerns. In the past, blasphemy 
refers to public concerns. Whereas, blasphemy in today’s issue refers to 
political-pragmatic16 concerns especially related to political general 
elections. In other words, in the past religious blasphemy concerned 
public (Muslims) solidarity, whereas today, it concerns sectarian 
political solidarity.  
In East Java alone, especially in Surabaya as the capital city of the 
province, many supporters of Muslim groups involve in a wide range 
of street demonstrations during the investigation of Ahok’s case until 
eventually taken to court. Some Muslim roups, especially those with 
hardline approach to Islam, frequently involved in various actions in 
East Java such as FPI, HTI, and smaller organizations like Ikatan Dai 
Indonesia (IKADI, Indonesian Association of Muslim Preachers).17 
They also mobilized people who are not affiliated to mass 
                                                                
12 Mark Cammack, “Islamic Law in Indonesia’s New Order,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 38, 1 (1989), pp. 53–73. 
13 M. Osa, “Creating Solidarity: the Religious Foundations of the Polish Social 
Movement,” East European Politics & Societies, 67, 11, 2 (1997): pp. 339–365.  
14 Bradley Lewis, “The Biopsychosocial Model and Philosophic Pragmatism: Is George 
Engel a Pragmatist? Philosophy,” Psychiatry, & Psychology, (2007), pp. 299-310. 
15 J. Haynes, “Religion and international relations in the 21st century: conflict or co-
operation?,” Third World Quarterly, 27, 3 (2006), p. 538. 
16 V. Dubljević, “Autonomy is Political, Pragmatic, and Postmetaphysical: A Reply to 
Open Peer Commentaries on ‘Autonomy in Neuroethics’,” AJOB Neuroscience, 7, 4 
(2016). 
17 “Massa Ormas Islam Jatim Demo Minta Ahok Dipejarakan,” https://www.tri-
bunnews.com/regional/2017/05/08/massa-ormas-islam-jatim-demo-minta-ahok-
dipenjarakan, accessed on 8 May 2017. 
  
M. Syamsul Huda 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 13, Number 01, June 2019 
100 
organizations such as people of various social networks. However, 
people who are subscribed to more moderate Islamic organizations 
such as NU and Muhammadiyah prefer taking neutral position, in a 
sense that as an organization they never encourage people (the 
followers) to participate in any demonstration. Nevertheless, though 
no direct instructions from the organization, quite many people of 
these two organizations took part in the demonstrations. Though the 
mobilization of mass movements is not as massive as in Jakarta, some 
Islamic mass organization actions did take place in many cities in East 
Java, especially Surabaya. It apparently indicates how religious terms 
(Islam) strategically influence and inspire islamic mass organizations, 
especially in the case of blasphemy. 
Hence, this article concerns on how Islamic social groups in East 
Java reformulate religious blasphemy in a broader perspective through 
formal theological and juridical perspective, for instance, as initiated by 
NU and Muhammadiyah. This paper will obviously contribute to 
formulate the definition of religious blasphemy. It will also attempt to 
identify every single move of religious thought related to political 
power. 
 
Reviewing The Phenomenon of Religious Blasphemy in 
Indonesia 
Religious blasphemy is not a novel phenomenon In Indonesia. 
However, the emergence of a case of religious blasphemy involving the 
figure of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), back then served as the 
Governor of Jakarta, the term of blasphemy of religion have additional 
dimension, politics. The emergence of religious blasphemy pheno-
menon in Indonesia deals with positive legal instruments which 
accommodates the religious blasphemy law. As mentioned earlier, 
Indonesia is one of the world’s 50 countries incorporating elements of 
blasphemy and misdirection in the formulation of state law. Thus, any 
conduct indicated to be despicable, abusive, defamatory, or offensive 
to a particular religion, may be directly subject to the law. 
Exploring the case of religious blasphemy throughout the history 
of Indonesia allows us to find many interesting facts. For instance, 
though the term of religious blasphemy previously did not exist, similar 
cases had occurred during Dutch colonial period, one of which is the 
case of Djawi Hiswara newspaper. In 1918, Djawi Hiswara published an 
article entitled Pertjakapan antara Marto dan Djojo [The conversation 
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between Marto and Djojo].18 The article mentioned that the Prophet 
Muhammad was drinking and enjoying opium. The article instantly 
ignited Muslim community’s emotion. HOS Tjokroaminoto, the leader 
of Sarikat Islam (SI) urged the masses to demonstrate. A total of 
150,000 people from forty-two places across Java and parts of Sumatra 
gathered to demand the colonial government to put Martodharsono 
and Djojodikoro into trial. The two gentlemen were then accused by 
HOS Tjokroaminoto as responsible for the newspaper Djawi Hiswara.19 
During 1965-2017 periods, 97 cases of blasphemy20 were listed. 
Interestingly, cases of blasphemy have grown even greater after the fall 
of the New Order regime. Prior to reformation era, only nine cases of 
blasphemy appeared, but immediately after the reform era, the number 
of cases of blasphemy in Indonesia increased greatly, 88 cases were 
noted. Among the blasphemy cases, Islam became the most desecrated 
religion. The remaining four cases hit Christianity, three cases for 
Catholicism, and two cases for Hinduism.21 
Similar to what happened to Djawi Hiswara newspaper, in August 
1968, a literary magazine published a novel entitled “Langit Makin 
Mendung”.22 The title contradicted to what lied in the content as it told 
a fictional story of prophet Muhammads whereabouts on earth, that 
was in Jakarta.23 It was revealed in the story that prophet Muhammad 
accompanied by Gabriel to conduct an investigation to eventually find 
out why only a few people eligible to enter paradise. During the 
investigation, the prophet was narrated to commit various adultery acts 
in Jakarta. In addition, the Prophet was pictured to have been drunk 
and committed various feuds. This certainly ignited conflicts among 
muslims.  
                                                                
18 Takashi Shiraishi, Zaman Bergerak Radikalisme Rakyat di Jawa 1912-1926 (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997), p. 144. 
19 Ahsanul Alfan, “Gerakan Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad (TKNM) Tahun 
1918,” Jurnal Avatara, 4, 3 (October 2016), p. 1151.  
20 Muhammad Dahri, “Tindak Pidana Penodaan Agama di Indonesia: Tinjauan 
Pengaturan Perundang-Undangan dan Konsep Hukum Islam,” Jurnal at-Tafahum, 1, 2 
(July-December 2017), p. 65. 
21 Ibid., p. 66. 
22 HB. Jassin, Heboh Sastra 1968: Suatu Pertanggungjawaban (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 
1970), p. 21.  
23 Arum Wahyuningtias, “Upaya HB. Jassin dalam Penyelesaian Polemik Heboh Sastra 
Cerpen ‘Langit Makin Mendung’ Karya Kipanjikusmin di Majalah Sastra Tahun 1968-
1970,” Jurnal Avatara, 3, 2 (July 2015), p. 237.  
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Likewise, the fictional work written in a literary magazine under a 
pseudonym of Ki Pandji Kusmin which eventually ignited the anger and 
fury of Indonesian Muslims followed by massive rallies. HB Jassin, the 
editor and also a prominent literary figure, became the target of 
growing anger after his refusal to reveal the man behind the 
pseudonym. HB Jassin insisted to protect the author from the demand 
of the protesters that the author should be punished by death penalty. 
Although HB Jassin and the literary magazine had proposed an 
apology, he was sent for trial and eventually deserved a one-year 
imprisonment. 
Another religious blasphemy was also accused to Arswendo 
Atmowiloto, a Catholic and, back then, the editor in chief of a well-
circulated tabloid named Monitor. He had to deal with legal case as he 
was considered to have blasphemed Islam after the tabloid released the 
results of a reader’s survey of popular personality through postcards in 
which prophet Muhammad was rank 11th24 Through the rubric named 
Kagum, Monitor announced a list of world leaders who obtained most 
admiration of the readers. According to the list, President Soeharto 
was number one with 5,003 admirers, BJ Habibi (2,975), the late 
President Soekarno (2,662), Iwan Fals (2,431). From the 5th to the 
10th: Zainudin MZ, Try Sutrisno, Saddam Hussein, Siti Hardiyanti 
Rukmana, and Atmowiloto himself ranked 10th with 797 admirers.25 
What triggered anger and emotion of most Indonesian Muslims was 
when Prophet Muhammad was included in the list, yet unfortunately, 
even under Atmowiloto, the editor-in-chief of the tabloid. 
As the result, criticism came from various media, such as Adil 
newspaper affiliated to Muhammadiyah with the headlines: Penghinaan 
terhadap Islam: Di balik Angket Monitor (Insulting Islam: behind the 
Monitor Survey). In addition, criticism also came from various Muslim 
figures and scholars such as Amien Rais and Nurcholish Madjid. After 
going through a long debate and discussion, Monitor was eventually 
banned by the government. In addition, Arswendo Atmowiloto 
himself was brought to court, though he had submitted an official 
apology. He was found guilty and subject to five years in prison.26 
                                                                
24 Mahi M. Hikmat, “Kebebasan Pers Kaitannya dengan Penodaan Terhadap Martabat 
Agama,” Jurnal al-Tsaqâfa, 9, 1 (June 2012), p. 16. 
25 Ibid., p. 16. 
26 Ibid., 16. 
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In 2006, post-reform era, 41 members of Lembaga Pelayanan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia (LPMI, Indonesian Student Service Institute) had 
to deal with the law.27 They were accused of holding a music event 
entitled Prayer Concert at Hotel Asida, Batu, Malang, which was 
considered to contain elements of insults towards Muslims. As the 
result, those students had to live their lives behind bars as found guilty 
by court and subject to 5 years imprisonment. 
In 2011, Antonius Richmond Bawengan, a Catholic, had to deal 
with law for similar case.28 He was accused of insulting religion, 
especially Catholicism and Islam, after distributing a number of leaflets 
and books which were deemed as offensive to the practices and 
elements of particular religious beliefs. The leaflets and books included 
Bencana Malapetaka Kecelakaan—Selamatkan Diri Dari Dajjal (Disaster 
Agony Disgrace - Save Yourself from Dajjal), Tiga Sponsor-Tiga Agenda-
Tiga Hasil (Three Sponsors-Three Agendas-Three Results), and Putusan 
Hakim Bebas (Verdict of not guilty). As the result, Antonius Richmond 
Bawengan was jailed for 5 years in prison. 
Furthermore, in 2012, another case of blasphemy involved 
Rusgiani, a housewife who was accused of insulting and harassing 
places of worship of Hindu Bali. It all started when Rusgiani stated: 
“Tuhan tidak bisa datang ke rumah ini, karena Canang ini jijik dan kotor.”29 
(God cannot come to this house (canang) as it is and dirty and 
disgusting). Rugiani was eventual reported the authority. After some 
processes in court, Rusgiani was sent for one year in prison.  
The most recent blasphemy case was the one involving the former 
Governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Cahaya Purnama (Ahok). Ahok is 
subject to a blasphemy law after he cited the verse of 51 al-Maidah of 
the Holy Quran. In his speech in Pulau Seribu, Ahok stated that 
Muslims should not be deceived by them (refering to Muslim 
leaders/politicians) using the verse.30 After mostly exposed through 
                                                                
27 “41 Penista Agama Divonis Lima Tahun”, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/107-
062/41-penista-agama-divonis-lima-tahun. 
28 Nazar Nurdin, “Delik Penodaan Agama Islam di Indonesia,” Journal Ihya Ulum Al-
Din, 19, 1 (2017), p. 131. 
29 Martien Herna Susanti, “Menguatkan Karakter Kebangsaan Indonesia di Era 
Globalisasi,” Prosiding Seminar Nasional PKn-Unnes (2017), p. 65. 
30 Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas and Gita Octaviani, “Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang 
Publik Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring ke Komunitas Luring,” Jurnal Pemikiran 
Sosiologi, 4, 2 (August 2017), p. 66.  
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cyberspace, Ahok was eventually prosecuted before the law. Apart 
from the controversy and debate that this particular case of Ahok had 
political interests and even refered to the practice of religious 
politicization and identity.31 Ahok was considered to have insulted the 
holy book of Muslims, the Quran. Many muslims then demanded, with 
action popularly known as Aksi Bela Islam (Action for Defending 
Islam), that Ahok should be sent before law and he was eventually 
found guilty and was sentenced to two years in prison.32  
From all the facts above, cases of blasphemy in Indonesia often 
involve mass mobilization and protests. A study has revealed that out 
of 97 blasphemy cases, 35 of them did not involve mass, while the 
other 62 cases involve the pressure of mass.33 Hence, it is assumed that 
most cases of religious blasphemy in Indonesia especially in relation to 
legal cases was apparently full of political interests so that the law for 
blasphemy cases in Indonesia was no longer relevant. It is assumed 
that the legal content of blasphemy was not in line with democracy, 
especially in favour of individual freedom right. Therefore, the review 
for legal construction of blasphemy, both theologically and judicially, 
needs to be undertaken.  
 
Reconstructing Religious Blasphemy in East Java 
Religious blasphemy is one of the crucial issues attract a wide 
range of attentions, spark debate, even ignite many controversies. This 
is due to the sensitiveness of the term blasphemy directly related to the 
religious dimension. In terms of public view, religion is believed as a 
sacred and holy.34 Thus, once a particular religion is desecrated, 
tainted, and harassed, resistance will likely appear as a form of self-
defense of the adherent of religion. Therefore, on many occasions, 
mass actions emerged in the name of sanctity and sacredness of their 
religion. 
In relation to this, the religious blasphemy committed by former 
Governor of Jakarta Province, Ahok was included. The case began 
                                                                
31 Ibid., p. 80. 
32 “Ahok Divonis Dua Tahun Penjara, Ini Komentar Jokowi,” https://nasional.kom-
pas.com/read/2017/05/09/17032111/ahok.divonis.dua.tahun.penjara.ini.komentar.jo
kowi. 
33 Dahri, “Tindak Pidana, p. 65. 
34 Soerjono Soekanto, Mengenal Tujuh Tokoh Sosiologi (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2002), p. 
200. 
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when Ahok made an official visit to Pulau Seribu in which during the 
visit, Ahok made a speech. In that speech, he urged the audience not 
to believe people who deceived voters using the verse of al-Maidah 
verse 51 for not vote for him in gubernatorial election.35 The word 
'deceived' sparked anger among muslim community. Ahok eventually 
dealt with law. Though many considered it was politically charged,36 
the fact that Ahok’s statement could be interpreted as blasphemy 
towards Islam cannot be denied. Therefore, Ahok eventually met the 
legal certainty that resulting in imprisonment for him. 
In many cases, the blasphemy crime such as the Ahok case is often 
followed by a large number of mass actions. The actions generally 
contained condemnation as well as demands to process the perpetrator 
before the law. While some major Muslim roups with a large number 
of membership such as NU and Muhammadiyah did not participate in 
the protests, several smaller yet eloquent Islamic groups such as FPI, 
HTI, FUI, MMI, Al-Irsyad, FS-LDK, Wahdah Islamiyah, Intellectual 
and Young Ulama Councils,37 and many other groups took part. In 
addition, some members of NU and Muhammadiyah or people who 
are affiliated to these two major organizations also joined the protests. 
Mass protests then spread out not only at the capital city of Indonesia, 
but also to many regions, including Surabaya in East Java province. 
Surabaya, as the capital city of the province, became the center of 
mobilizations of some theological puritans and political Islamists38 
groups frequently involved in several protests such as FPI, HTI, and 
IKADI.39 These three groups initiated mass protests in the city. Yet, 
similar to Jakarta-based protests, while other Muslim roups such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah prefered to stay put, in a sense, some of their 
members decided to take part in the actions. Though the mass 
                                                                
35 “Ini Transkrip Lengkap Ucapan Ahok di Kepulauan Seribu,” https://www.edu-
news.id/news/politik/ini-transkrip-lengkap-ucapan-ahok-di-kepulauan-seribu. 
36 Interview with deputy of chairman PWNU East Java on 14 December 2018. 
37 Pamungkas et. al, “Aksi Bela Islam, p. 68. 
38 For the lack of precise category, these two terms are used at once to represent 
groups that protested Ahok’s blasphemous statement. The terms are borrowed from 
Abdullah Saeed’s typology. See his book entitled Islamic Thought: An Introduction 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 142-148. 
39 “Massa Ormas Islam Jatim Demo Minta Ahok Dipejarakan,” https://www.tribun-
news.com/regional/2017/05/08/massa-ormas-islam-jatim-demo-minta-ahok-dipenja-
rakan. 
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mobilization was as not as massive as those in Jakarta, the actions in 
Surabaya simply indicated how religious (Islamic) terms are fairly 
strategic in influencing and inspiring the mobilization of Islamic mass 
organizations especially in response to religious blasphemy cases. 
In relation to this, an interesting fact appear dealing with the 
involvement of Muslim roups in most cases of religious blasphemy as 
most Muslim groups share common comprehension in interpreting 
blasphemy. Thus, whenever the practice of blasphemy occur, they 
unite and move together. They conduct simultaneous actions of 
rejection and demand for legal prosecution. This type of Muslim 
groups often shows militancy; not only condemn or criticize, but also 
carry out fierce demonstration which mostly ended in riot and many 
other anarchic actions. Nevertheless, some organizations are abstain 
from mass protests. They prioritize the settlement in a familial manner, 
and discussion. Conversely, some other organizations are resistant.  
In relation to this, we see how Muslim groups s show different 
reactions towards the religious blasphemers. HTI and FPI indicated 
resistant as well as militant style. Moreover, according to some studies, 
both organizations tend to be radical.40 They tend to understand 
Islamic text as it is to digest all kinds of issues including political issue. 
Whereas, NU and Muhammadiyah are more likely to prioritize 
harmony and legal processes. These two different attitudes raised 
important questions of which answer is desperately needed 
immediately: about their construction in responding certain issues and 
about the understanding of blasphemy. As it is possible that the 
differences in response to blasphemy are closely related to their 
understanding of the meaning of blasphemy. 
In general, based on empirical study, the construction of religious 
blasphemy in relation to Muslim groups in East Java is categorized into 
two. First, some Muslim groups literally refer to religious texts in 
responding blasphemous acts. For this particular group, blasphemy 
occurs when a group or individual commits a disgraceful act towards 
Islam and / or religious activities of Islam. Blasphemy against Islam is 
efforts to descredit a particular religion, to persecute the religion and 
its groups, intentionally or unintentionally.41 The main reference of 
such group is religious texts such as the Holy Qur'an and hadith which 
                                                                
40 Pamungkas et al, “Aksi Bela Islam, p. 69. 
41 Interview with the head of al-Irsyad Surabaya on 11 December 2017. 
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are textually interpreted.42 Two Muslim groups of the Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI) and Al-Irsyad belong to to this category. 
For Al-Irsyad, in the context of life among religious believers, the 
term blasphemy is important to regulate inter-religious relations.43 
However, blasphemy is still in need to have a definition. That way, 
Muslims who work in the field of da‘wah and preach the message of 
monotheism but deliberately offend believers of other religions, will 
surely be considered as blasphemy.44 With this context, Al-Irsyad has a 
special view, that people of majority religion (Muslims) must be 
prioritized, and their aspirations must also be prioritized over than 
other religious minorities. This is not a form of intolerance. Islam has 
been able to survive due to this tolerant attitudes. Al-Irsyad will always 
uphold this spirit of unity (of Indonesia) on this basis.45 
Nevertheless, though this Muslim group puts forward theological 
elements in interpreting blasphemy actions, they still uphold legal 
aspects, but in lesser emphasis. Their attitudes in favor of theological 
aspects makes this group have the simplistic majority-minority 
approach; the tendency to identify themselves as a majority group 
while other religious groups are called a minority group. This approach 
directly leads to an unbalanced relationship as they will present 
dominative actions, including matters of religious discourses. 
Unfortunately, in a democratic context, it is irrelevant due to their 
discriminating values. In addition, this group also has strong militant 
spirit in the name of Islamic religion. The spirit is manifested in their 
attitude to always use narrow religious perspective when viewing socio-
political issues. For them, religions and politics has no demarcation, 
religion must be used as point of reference for anything including 
politics. Islam deals with all aspects of human life. This is the Islam 
way for every Muslim. 
In relation to this political aspect, FPI believes that religion can be 
included into political dimension, but not the other way around, 
including politics into religious dimension. As they believe that 
presenting religion in politics is to uphold the interest of religion. That 
is the sole purpose of politics. They believe that Islam has its own 
                                                                
42 Interview with the head of FPI Pamekasan on 11 January 2018. 
43 Interview with the head of al-Irsyad Surabaya on 11 December 2017.  
44 Interview with the head of al-Irsyad Surabaya on 11 December 2017.  
45 Interview with the head of al-Irsyad Surabaya on 11 December 2017.  
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concept on politics, how politics is implemented, and in context 
politics must be applied. This is called siyasah.46 As a reference, this 
group refer to the political role of Prophet Muhammad. Prophet 
Muhammad also played a pivotal political role both in Mecca and 
Medina. Prophet Muhammad taught Muslims to actively participate to 
manage the country as part of religious duties. FPI consider that 
Muslims should be politically active. Passive involvement of Muslim 
community in politics will allow minority groups to dominate the 
Indonesian politics which will eventually make Muslims excluded.47 
The second group is Muslim groups that appreciate legal 
establishment of the state. Unlike previously mentioned group, in 
addition to religious conviction, these groups also emphasized the use 
of a positive legal perspective in interpreting blasphemy. They value 
the positive law due to their views that Indonesian is neither a religious 
country nor the secular one. Indonesia has a distinct ideology named 
Pancasila in which its first precept is the oneness of God.48 Hence, 
philosophically, though the affirmation of Islam is not clearly stated, 
the relationship among believers of many religions in Indonesia has 
been long regulated. Therefore, matters concerned with blasphemy are 
included. Otherwise, cases beyond regulation are irrelevant as it will 
surely attract response apparently contradictive to law.49 The groups of 
its kinds are several Muslim groups such as MUI, Muhammadiyah, and 
NU.  
Moreover, Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) as an institution in 
charge of issuing fatwa has referred to the Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 on 
Abuse and/or Religious Blasphemy then confirmed through the 
Decision of Constitutional Court Number 140 / PUU-VII / 2009 
dated April 19, 2010, as well as the Decision on criminal acts against 
religion in the Criminal Code, Articles 155, 156a, 175, 176, 177, 503, 
530, 545, 546 and 547. The regulations clearly prohibit each individual 
to insult, abuse, harass or defame any religion in Indonesia. Thus, 
when actions of religious defamation arise, the individuals or groups 
                                                                
46 Interview with the head of FPI Pamekasan on 11 January 2018. 
47 Interview with the head of FPI Pamekasan on 11 January 2018. 
48 Interview with deputy Muhammadiyah East Java on 27 December 2017. 
49 Interview with deputy Muhammadiyah East Java on 27 December 2017. 
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will be legally processed as religious blasphemers then will be brought 
to court.50 
Likewise, Muhammadiyah personalities show similar attitude on 
this issue. They consider blasphemy as an act of contradicting the 
thawa>bit} (principles or fundamental tenets) of religion.51 Examples of 
thawa>bit} in Islam include the existence and oneness of God, the 
existence of angels, the prophethood of Muhammad, the five-time 
daily prayer, zakah (obligatory alms), the obligation of h}ajj pilgrimage, 
prohibition of adultery, etc. Though in some cases, these elements are 
debatable, each religion obviously has different religious doctrine and 
dogma. Thus, debatable matters should be resolved by the existing law 
in Indonesia, as clearly regulated in the constitution. Ahok 
blasphemous case falls into this category. Its nature is debatable since 
there are various meanings to the word wali in the verse 51 of chapter 
al-Maidah of the Holy Quran.  
NU also has its own understanding of religious practice. In general, 
NU implements the same principle as other Muslim groups in a way 
that denouncing religion refers to actions containing elements of 
disgrace towards religion and religious practice. The religious context 
refers to fundamental, basic and substantial matters in the religion. For 
instance, Islam considers some actions as religious blasphemy when 
they closely relate to the God oneness (tawh}i>d), the holy book, 
Muhammad’s prophethood, and other principles. Interpreting the 
Holy Al-Qur'an at own convenience without authority or profound 
knowledge of it52 as committed by Ahok is also considered blasphemy, 
but a mild one. In addition, more extreme blasphemy might be 
indicated through declaration confirming that messages in particular 
religious scriptures as human fabrication like what Salman Rushdi 
stated in his “The Satanic Verses”. In similar manner, portraying the 
facial image of the Prophet Muhammad as conducted by the french 
Magazine, Charlie Hebdo is considered blasphemy since such an act is 
strictly forbidden Islam. 
Nonetheless, NU has different perception on blasphemy 
compared to other Muslim groups. Degrees of carefulness should be 
applied in examining a religious blasphemy rather than immediately 
                                                                
50 Interview with Secretary of MUI East Java on 12 December 2017. 
51 Interview with Deputy Muhammadiyah East Java on 27 December 2017.. 
52 Interview with Deputy NU East Java on 14 December 2017. 
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putting it into legal process. NU will not carelessly draw conclusions 
refering to only a single religious text. In this regard, NU has different 
ways of understanding blasphemy. 
First, each case of religious blasphemy is purely based on a 
religious point of view before it become the subject of legal process. 
No other elements should intervene religious examination, especially 
when it is concerned with political domain. In relation to Ahok’s case, 
political veneer was more dominant than the blasphemy itself. For this 
reason, NU strongly emphasizes the importance of caution so that the 
defamation runs within a proper context, free from conflict of political 
interests.53 
Secondly, NU has its own point of view that blasphemy is not a 
single term to be identified against all forms of ill-treatment dealing 
with Islam. Thus, religious blasphemy is the most-tolerated treatment 
against religion. Another three more qualities of blasphemy are on the 
list such as defamation, harassment, humiliation, and hostility.54 As 
treated as the most tolerated action, blasphemy cases genarally can be 
resolved properly. Thus, those who are proven guilty, Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama in this case, must be willing to admit their mistakes and make 
public apology. This way, NU considers that no further actions needed 
especially when it involves mass mobilization as it may ruin national 
unity. However, public apology does not mean getting rid of legal 
process. The law shlould always be implemented as it should be. 
 
Conclusion 
Religious blasphemy happened now and then in Indonesia. This 
article confirms that blasphemy is a word that the public use especially 
when pragmatic political logic, formal law, and religious interpretation 
collide. The abuse of religious narrative for political purposes turns to 
ignite profane problems and conflicts rather than upholding religious 
sacred texts. As a result, emotional actions are triggered and enabled 
people to force the religious blasphemers to justice. The Ahok case has 
been so precisely illustrative. It ripped apart the solidarity and tolerance 
of Muslims in Indonesia. While this particular issue builds social 
actions in the form of solidarity and collectivity of mass organizations 
throughout Indonesia, it also stimulated debate among Muslim groups 
                                                                
53 Interview with deputy NU East Java on 14 December 2017. 
54 Interview with deputy NU East Java on 14 December 2017. 
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in Indonesia. After MUI issued that fatwa against Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama for his blasphemous statement, Muslim groups split into two. 
In Surabaya, East Java, such a polarization does occur. The supporters 
of MUI fatwa, such as FPI and HTI tends to have textual, normative 
with Islamic political reference. They accused Ahok as aggressively 
violating Islamic law and causing Muslims uncomfortable with his 
statement and that is why he should send to prison. Whereas NU and 
Muhammadiyah in Surabaya have a more moderate theological 
construction in the consideration on the case of Ahok. This case does 
not belong to a major case of blasphemy since it does not concern the 
fundamental aspect of Islam. Yet, it belongs to a form of misconduct 
towards Islam. Then Ahok, thus, is not labeled as a serious but 
tolerated religious blasphemer, so that, with his misconduct, he simply 
requires to apologizes to Muslims. Apparently, the national political 
attitudes of NU and Muhammdiyah that put more concern on 
tolerance towards religious diversity is more dominant than political 
identity which result in intolerance to observers of other religions.[] 
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